Giffen goods and market making

Summary. This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Giffen goods anomaly affecting traders demands in multi asset noisy, rational expectations equilibrium markets. The role that information plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual trading motive: speculation and market making. The former entails using prices to assess the effect of error terms; the latter requires employing them to disentangle noise traders demands within aggregate orders. In a correlated environment this complicates the signal extraction problem and may generate upward sloping demand curves. Assuming (i) that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or that (ii) uninformed traders risk tolerance coefficient grows unboundedly, removes the market making component from informed traders demands rendering them well behaved in prices.Received: 30 April 2002, Revised: 3 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G100, G120, G140.Support from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and the Ente per gli Studi Monetari e Finanziari Luigi Einaudi, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Anat Admati, Jordi Caballé, Giacinta Cestone, and Xavier Vives for useful suggestions. The comments provided by the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee greatly improved the papers exposition.     

我国跨国公司融资问题分析

我国跨国企业资本结构不尽合理，资产负债率总体水平偏低，而且呈稳中趋降的趋势。造成这一现象的根本原因是我国跨国企业在融资顺序的选择上倾向于股权融资而忽视债权融资，存在明显的股权融资偏好，这与融资优序理论相悖。本文以跨国企业为研究对象，从我国跨国企业融资行为及其导致的资本结构存在的问题入手，通过对这种现象产生的原因的深入分析，对我国跨国企业融资结构优化提出了几点建议。     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

产业集聚、技术创新与城市经济动力

构建一个基于企业内生创新的具有正反馈效应的城市经济动力系统,旨在阐明产业集聚、技术创新与城市经济的关系。产业集聚的确有利于创新的产生,但绝非必然,甚至有时还会由于知识拥挤导致经济停滞。技术生命周期理论可以帮助我们解释产业集聚与创新集聚间的关系。城市提供创新激励,然而因吸收能力不同企业创新绩效也存在差异,这是城市经济差异的重要原因。     

中国金融改革中的金融脆弱性问题研究

金融脆弱性问题是中国金融改革中必须正确认识的问题，通过对金融脆弱性问题的解决实现化解金融风险。降低金融危机的发生。本文通过对金融脆弱性的基本内涵、基本观点、金融脆弱性的根源以及我国金融体系脆弱性表现，对金融脆弱性问题进行了分析与研究。     

金融衍生工具的风险暴露与监控框架设计

分析金融衍生工具的活动特点，观察金融衍生工具的风险暴露，研究金融衍生工具各种监控方式的内涵、主要操作手法、适用的范围以及可供选择的对策，有助于建立起全球性金融衍生工具监控框架设计体系。     

关于金融风险监测的思考

文章根据金融风险预警指标体系的设计原则，提出一套由八个指标构成的金融风险监测预警指标体系，并用综合指数法对金融风险进行综合度量。     

构建现代企业财务管理机制的思考

落后的财务管理思想、机制和方法,是中国企业规模小、效益差、生命周期短的深层次的和根本的原因。因此,建立完善的现代企业财务管理机制是提高我国企业经济效益和建立现代企业制度的重要途径。财务管理机制作为现代企业管理系统中最为重要的子系统,它应该围绕运行机制、动力机制、监督机制和控制机制四项内容而建立和完善。     

金融产业集聚的形成模式研究：全球视角与中国的选择

金融产业集聚的形成，本质上来源于经济的发展和演化并具有自组织变迁的规律。从世界金融中心的形成经验可以发现，金融产业集群的形成主要分为自发演化和嵌入发展两种不同模式。本文在对伦敦和新加坡这两种截然不同的金融集聚形成模式分析的基础上，归纳出金融产业集聚形成的主要因素，并对我国大力推进该产业集聚的发展提供对策建议。     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.